The inclusion of Asia World Chairman Htun Myint Naing, better known as Steven Law, in Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s recent visit to China appears to carry significance beyond that of an ordinary business delegation.

Steven Law has maintained longstanding business ties with China and has direct economic interests in the suspended Myitsone hydropower project, which has remained on hold since 2011.

According to a New Day Myanmar source with connections to both military and business circles, discussions during the Beijing trip included the possibility of reviving the controversial Myitsone project.

“The issue of restarting Myitsone was part of the discussions during this China trip,” the source said.

Neither side has publicly mentioned the Myitsone project in the agreements and statements released following the visit. However, the composition of the delegation, the junta’s recent activities related to the project, and assurances given to China regarding the protection of Chinese investments have strengthened speculation that negotiations may already be underway behind the scenes.

Steven Law is the chairman of Asia World, one of Myanmar’s largest conglomerates, with business interests spanning roads and bridges, ports, airports, power generation, telecommunications, real estate, construction and finance.

His father, Lo Hsing Han, was described in international reports and by U.S. authorities as a figure linked to narcotics trafficking and closely connected to previous military governments.

In 2008, the United States imposed sanctions on Steven Law, Lo Hsing Han, Asia World and affiliated companies, alleging that they had provided financial and material support to Myanmar’s former military regime. Those sanctions were lifted in 2016 when Washington ended its Myanmar sanctions program.

Global Witness investigations have also linked Steven Law to jade mining operations in Kachin State, suggesting that his interests in the region extend beyond the Myitsone project to natural resource extraction and infrastructure development.

The Myitsone dam project, valued at approximately US$3.6 billion, was originally led by China Power Investment Corporation (CPI), which later became part of State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC).

Under the original ownership structure, CPI was expected to hold an 80 percent stake, the Myanmar government 15 percent, and Asia World five percent.

In 2009, CPI, the Myanmar government’s power generation enterprise and Asia World established a joint venture company to develop the Myitsone dam and other hydropower projects along the upper Ayeyarwady River.

Research compiled by ISP Myanmar’s China Desk, citing the International Rivers organization, indicates that Asia World was expected to receive not only its five percent equity share but also a ten percent brokerage or facilitation fee. However, the full project contracts have never been made public, leaving significant questions regarding profit-sharing arrangements unanswered.

Asia World was not merely a shareholder. The company also served as a local contractor and implementation partner, including involvement in the construction of relocation villages for communities displaced by the project.

If the project were revived, Asia World could potentially benefit not only from its equity stake but also from construction contracts, transportation services, road and bridge development, logistics operations, land development and other related business opportunities.

Reviving a project as large and controversial as Myitsone would require far more than a political decision.

The original contracts, ownership arrangements, profit-sharing mechanisms, electricity allocation plans, dam design specifications, compensation packages for affected communities, security arrangements and construction contracts would all likely need to be renegotiated.

In that context, Steven Law—already embedded in the original project and maintaining longstanding relationships with Chinese companies and successive Myanmar governments—could once again emerge as a key intermediary and implementation partner.

The composition of Min Aung Hlaing’s delegation also raises questions.

Alongside ministers responsible for electricity, investment, industry and trade, the chief ministers of Kachin and Shan states were included in the trip.

While the participation of Kachin State’s chief minister could be related to broader border trade and Chinese investment projects, any attempt to revive Myitsone would inevitably require cooperation from regional authorities responsible for land administration, security arrangements and local public engagement.

In 2024, the military authorities established a steering committee for the Myitsone and upper Ayeyarwady hydropower projects and tasked it with cooperating with SPIC Yunnan on technical studies, research and public relations activities.

Min Aung Hlaing has also publicly argued that Myanmar could have generated 6,000 megawatts of electricity had the Myitsone project not been suspended, claiming it would have helped meet national demand and potentially created surplus power.

Such statements appear to link Myanmar’s current electricity shortages to the suspension of Myitsone and could be interpreted as an effort to build public acceptance for restarting the project.

The junta leader has additionally assured Beijing that his administration will not allow activities that threaten Chinese projects and interests inside Myanmar.

Given the strong public opposition that forced Myitsone’s suspension in 2011, those assurances may be relevant not only to existing Chinese investments but also to any future effort to restart the dam.

For China, Myitsone represents more than a hydropower project.

The indefinite suspension of a major project backed by a Chinese state-owned company has long been viewed as a negative precedent for Chinese overseas investments.

Even if the project were modified—through a smaller dam design, revised electricity-sharing arrangements or greater emphasis on domestic consumption—its revival could help China protect both its contractual interests and broader strategic investments in Myanmar.

For Min Aung Hlaing, advancing Chinese-backed projects such as Myitsone could serve as a bargaining tool for securing political support, investment and economic assistance from Beijing.

For Steven Law and Asia World, a restart would offer an opportunity to revive dormant commercial interests and regain access to lucrative construction, transportation, land development and service contracts linked to the project.

At present, there is no official confirmation that construction of the Myitsone dam will resume in the immediate future.

However, when viewed together—the formation of the Myitsone steering committee, Min Aung Hlaing’s public comments linking the project to electricity shortages, his assurances regarding Chinese investments, the presence of Steven Law, the electricity minister and the Kachin chief minister in the Beijing delegation, and New Day Myanmar’s source claiming that Myitsone was discussed during the visit—there are growing indications that political, economic and security-related negotiations surrounding a possible revival of the project may already be underway.

Yet one point remains clear: the future of Myitsone cannot be determined solely by the Chinese government, Myanmar’s military authorities, or the business interests that stand to benefit from it. The project’s fate will ultimately remain tied to the voices, concerns and consent of the people who will live with its consequences.